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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This being an appeal from conviction of a first degree felony, inter alia, the Supreme
Court is granted original appellate jurisdiction over this case by Section 78-2-2 U.C.A.
(1953), as amended, subject to referral to the Court of Appeals.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
FIRST ISSUE: Whether the form submitted by the defendant demanding disposition of the charges pending against him within 120 days as provided by Chapter 77-29
U.C.A. was legally deficient.
Standard of Appellate Review: The trial court's ruling is based upon an interpretation of of a statute, which is a question of law. Bonham v. Morgan, 102 Utah Adv. Rep 8;
State v. Chindgren, 777 P2d 527. "A trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness and are not given special deference." State v. Wagner, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 21,22,
citing Bountiful v. Riley, 124 Utah Adv. Rep. 15; and Western Kane Co. Special Service
District No.l v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376.
SECOND ISSUE: Whether the State is estopped from asserting the deficiency of
the form used by the defendant to demand disposition of pending charges, where the form
used was prepared by state officials and furnished to the defendant for the purpose of making
demand for disposition under the statute in question.
Standard of Appellate Review: The application of the doctrine of estoppel is a
question of law and, in this case, a question raised by the defendant, but not ruled upon by
the trial court. Therefore, the appellate court should determine the issue from the record,
without since no findings of fact were entered by the trial court, ibid.
THIRD ISSUE: Whether the original setting of trial beyond the 120-day time limit,
can be considered "a continuance" within the meaning of Section 77-29-1 (3) so as to excuse the failure of the prosecutor to bring the matter to trial earlier, where no earlier date

2

was ever proposed, where the trial court was unaware of the defendant's demand for disposition, the prosecution failed to inform the court concerning said demand, and where no
motion or other request for continuance was ever made or filed by either party.
Standard of Appellate Review: The trial court's Finding of Fact No. 5, entered in
connection with its ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, ruled that the delay of trial
herein was intentionally granted by the court for the specific purpose of allowing the defendant time to resolve the problems he was having with his counsel. This ruling is a finding
of fact which should be upheld unless clearly erroneous, i.e. against the clear weight of the
evidence in the record, or unless the appellate court reaches a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made.
However, the court's treatment of the delay of trial as a continuance for purposes of
Section 77-29-1, necessarily involves an interpretation of that statute, which is a legal conclusion subject to full appellate review.
FOURTH ISSUE: Assuming that the setting of trial beyond the 120 days is found
to constitute a continuance within the meaning of Section 77-29-1, whether the expiration
of 218 days between the delivery of defendant's demand for disposition and the date of trial
is reasonable under the circumstances of this case.
Standard of Appellate Review: Whether a delay is reasonable or not is a question
of law and is therefore entitled to be considered by the reviewing court without any deference
to the ruling of the trial court.
FIFTH ISSUE: Whether the defendant's failure to object at trial setting to the setting of the trial beyond the 120-day limit constitutes a waiver of his rights under the said
statute.
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Standard of Appellate Review: The existence and requisite elements of a waiver
of rights is likewise a question of law, therefore the trial court's ruling is to be reviewed
without any presumption as to its validity.
SIXTH ISSUE: Whether Section 77-29-1 places a burden on the defendant to show
prejudice from the delay of trial beyond the 120-day limit in order to claim the protection
of said statute, as stated by Conclusion of Law No. 6 in the trial court' s Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law Regarding Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, hereafter "Findings",
(page 3, paragraph 6).
Standard of Appellate Review: As a matter of statutory interpretation, this issue
poses a question of law which is to be reviewed independent of the trial court's ruling.
SEVENTH ISSUE: Whether the Court's findings that "the delay in conducting the
trial did not result from actions or inaction by the prosecution" is supported by the record,
particularly where the court was admittedly unaware of defendant's demand for disposition
at the time of trial setting.
Standard of Appellate Review: The trial court's findings of fact are entitled to be
sustained if they are not clearly erroneous.
EIGHTH ISSUE: Whether the refusal of the trial judge to disqualify himself was
proper without following procedure required by Rule 29(c) U.R.Cr.P.
Standard of Appellate Review: The effect of non-compliance with a procedural
rule is a question of law subject to plenary review.
NINTH ISSUE: Whether the refusal of the trial judge to disqualify himself was in
error where he had, prior to his appointment to the bench, prosecuted the defendant for rape
and, following his appointment, had recused himself from conducting a trial of the defendant on the basis of his participation in the aforesaid prosecution.
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Standa rd of A ppellate Review: No hearing was held or findings made on this issue,
however, the facts alleged as evidence of bias (Judge Bunnell's having prosecuted this defendant and his previous disqualification of himself as presiding judge in a subsequent trial)
are undisputed and are matters of public record, of which judicial notice ma)^ be taken.
Defendant contends that these facts show bias as a matter of law, thus the issue should be
reviewed by the applellate court without deference to the ruling below.
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated (1953), Section 77-29-1
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state prison, jail,
or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is pending against
the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, and the prisoner shall
deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or any appropriate
agent of the same, a written demand specifying the nature of the charge and the court
wherein it is pending and requesting disposition of the pending charge, he shall be
entitled to have the charge brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of
written notice.
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand described
in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be forwarded by personal
delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or custodial officer shall, upon request
of the prosecuting attorney so notified, provide the attorney with such information
concerning the term of commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested.
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the prosecuting
attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in open court, with
the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any reasonable continuance.
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that the failure of the
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prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for continuance was made or not,
the court shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice.
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 29 (c) & (d)
(c) If the prosecution or a defendant in any criminal action or proceeding files an affidavit that the judge before whom the action or proceeding is to be tried or heard
has a bias or prejudice, either against the party or his attorney or in favor of any opposing party to the suit, the judge shall proceed no further until the challenge is disposed of. Every affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that the
bias or prejudice exists and shall be filed as soon as practicable after the case has
been assigned or the bias or prejudice is known. No affidavit may be filed unless accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record that the affidavit and application are
made in good faith.
(d) If the challenged judge questions the sufficiency of the allegation of disqualification, he shall enter an order directing that a copy be forthwith certified to another
named judge of the same court or of a court of like jurisdiction, which judge shall
then pass upon the legal sufficiency of the allegations. If the challenged judge does
not question the legal sufficiency of the affidavit, or if the judge to whom the affidavit is certified finds that it is legally sufficient, another judge shall be called to
try the case or to conduct the proceedings. If the judge to whom the affidavit is certified does not find the affidavit to be legally sufficient, he shall enter a finding to
that effect and the challenged judge shall proceed with the case or proceeding.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
The defendant was tried and convicted of Aggravated Burglary, two counts of Attempted Murder, and of being an habitual criminal. This appeal, however, deals with the
demand made by the defendant for disposition of his case within 120 days, the failure of the
State to bring the case to trial within said time limit, and the denial of defendant's motion
to dismiss the charges against him and of his motion to disqualify Judge Bunnell from conducting his trial.
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT
The crime occurred on or about June 3, 1989. Because the defendant was injured
and hospitalized, no charges were filed until July 6,1989.
The defendant filed his demand for disposition under Section 77-29-1 on or about
July 12,1989 with officials of the Utah State Prison where he was being held pending revocation of his parole. For reasons unknown, the demand was not entered in the court's file, although the prosecutor did receive a copy. The defendant did not make his counsel aware of
the demand until shortly before trial, after the 120 days had expired. The trial court was not
made aware of the demand until the defendant filed his motion to dismiss on the basis of
the failure of the prosecution to comply therewith.
The Defendant was brought before the Seventh Circuit Court for presentment on
July 27,1989. Allen S. Thorpe, the Emery County Public Defender was appointed to represent the defendant. A preliminary examination was conducted on August 3,1989, following which the defendant was bound over to the Seventh District Court and arraigned on
September 6,1989.
At the arraignment, the Court set trial for February 15, 1990 without objection by
either party. At this hearing, the defendant requested the Court to appoint different counsel
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because of dissatisfaction with the Public Defender's handling of his case. The court declined
to appoint new counsel, but indicated that it might reconsider should the defendant file a
complaint with the State Bar. The court further noted that the trial had been set far enough
away so that the defendant would have time to resolve his differences with his attorney or
to have new counsel appointed.
The defendant thereafter filed complaints with the State Bar concerning the public
defender, Allen S. Thorpe. Following several exchanges of letters, Mr. Thorpe concluded
that the antagonism the defendant held toward him could not be resolved and that it would
inevitably interfere with his ability to adequately represent the defendant, and moved the
court for leave to withdraw. The Court denied this motion and on January 12,1990 appointed
Keith H. Chiara, Esq., of Price, Utah as associate counsel for the defendant. Mr. Chiara met
with the defendant who disclosed to him the existence of the aforementioned demand for
disposition, whereupon Mr. Chiara filed a motion to dismiss on February 7, 1990 on the
grounds that such disposition had been denied. Defense Counsel also filed a motion to sever
Count IV of the information (possession of a firearm by a convicted felon) which was
granted, and a motion in limine to restrain the prosecution from referring to Defendant's
prior convictions during the trial, which motion was also granted.
A hearing was held on the motion to dismiss on February 14, 1990, the day before
the trial, and after reviewing the record, receiving the Defendant's testimony and hearing
argument, the court denied the motion. The court signed and entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law prepared by the prosecution in support of its ruling on this motion.
On the date of trial the defendant filed a motion to disqualify Judge Boyd Bunnell
from conducting the trial on the grounds that Judge Bunnell had previously, as District Attorney, prosecuted the defendant, and had lecused himself from presiding over a trial of the
defendant in December of 1981. The Court denied this motion without a hearing and
proceeded with trial.
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The case was tried to a jury on February 15 and 16, following which the jury returned
a verdict of guilty on Counts I, II and HI. Following this verdict, the defendant waived the
right to a jury for trial of Count V, the habitual criminal count, on which the Court also found
the defendant guilty.
RELEVANT FACTS
On the night of June 2 and early morning of June 3, 1989 an intruder entered the
home of Mrs. Lola Jewkes, of Orangeville, Utah. Mrs. Jewkes was asleep but her adult
daughter, Rosanne Jewkes, had arisen to take their dog outside. She noticed a pick-up truck
on the road to the west of the house and watched it as it was driven around the comer and
into her driveway. She observed a man exit the vehicle, but did not see where he went. She
turned on her flashlight and entered the back door of the home. She encountered the intruder
coming down the hallway and shone the flashlight in his face. She later identified the intruder as being the defendant, with whom she was acquainted.
The intruder seized her by the throat and put a gun against her stomach. Apparently they moved into the kitchen, because Rosanne testified that she pushed the gun away and
it fell onto the cupboard or counter. As Rosanne struggled with her assailant, he began to
choke her and she lost consciousness.
Lola Jewkes, having been awakened by the sounds of the struggle, arose and came
into the kitchen and was sized by the throat as well. She was struck in the face by the
intruder's fist and forced to the floor. Rosanne recovered to see the intruder on top of her
mother hitting her, and tried to pull him off, tearing his tee shirt in the attempt. This gave
Lola an opportunity to regain her feet. She happened to feel the grate on the gas range and
took it and began to hitting her attacker on the head with it. At this point, the attacker apparently decided he had had enough and retreated out the back door. Rosanne, who was
hysterical, found the gun on the cupboard and fired it after the intruder. She testified that
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she did so to discourage him from coming back. She was entirely ignorant about firearms
and simply pulled the trigger, not knowing how to cock the pistol.
A neighbor girl had observed a man enter the house and heard screams and notified
the county sheriffs office. When the sheriff's deputies arrived, they found the defendant
lying face-down several yards from the house with bullet wound in his back and a trail of
blood leading to the garage door. His tee shirt was torn from his body except for a narrow
strip around his waist. He was taken to the hospital and treated for the injury. The bullet had
traveled through his body entering his lower left back and exiting his chest, just below his
heart.
The defendant was charged on July 6, 1989 with having burglarized the home of
Mrs. Jewkes and attempting to murder her and her daughter. The defendant having been
previously convicted of and sentenced to prison for felony offenses, at least one of which
was a Second Degree Felony, he was also charged with possession of a firearm by a
prohibited person, and with being an habitual criminal under Section 76-8-1001, U.C.A.
The defendant, on or about July 12, 1989, delivered a form styled "Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending Charge(s)" to June Hinckley, an authorized agent of the
Utah State Prison, pursuant to Section 77-29-1, U.C.A. directed to the Director of the Prison
and requesting final disposition of charges, which were stated to be pending in Emery County, and further requesting that the Director forward the notice to "the appropriate authorities
in that county, together with such other information as required by law."
The prison sent a copy of said notice to the Emery County Attorney who received
the same a few days later. However, no copy of this notice was found in the Court's file,
and the defendant's attorney was not made aware that demand for disposition had been made
until a few days before the trial.
The rest of the proceedings are as set forth above.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
FIRST ISSUE: Responding to the defendant's motion to dismiss state argued that
the the form submitted by the defendant demanding disposition of the charges pending
against him was legally deficient, citing State v. Viles 702 P.2d 1175 (1985) and State v.
Wright 745 P.2d 447 (1987). The court ruled that the form used was technically deficient
in that it did not state in which court the charges were pending, but also ruled that the statute
did not require strict technical compliance with its terms, so long as the County Attorney
received it. (See Motions Hearing Transcript, pgs 20-21). Defendant contends that the form
used does substantially comply with the statute in that it sets forth the information required
insofar as it was available to the defendant.
SECOND ISSUE: The defendant's position is that, if the form used is determined
to be noncompliant with the statute, the State is nevertheless estopped from asserting techinal
deficiencies as grounds for denying him the relief sought, since the State through the prison
officials furnished the form, advised the defendant on how to assert his demand under Section 77-29-1 and undertook to send the notice to the appropriate agencies. As it turned out
only the County Attorney of Emery County was given actual notice of the demand, but there
is no assertion that any confusion existed in his mind as to who the defendant was, which
case the notice referred to, or in which court the case was pending.
THIRD ISSUE: The court's setting of the trial beyond the 120-day limit was not
an extention from some other suggested date within said limit, and was therefore not a "continuance," nor could it have been, since the court was unaware of the defendant's demand
for disposition. The State seems to have persuaded the trial court to excuse its failure to bring
this matter to trial within the statutory time limit, by finding that, but for the conflict between the defendant and his counsel, the case would have been tried within the 120 days.
No basis for this conclusion exists in the record. To reach this conclusion, one must necessarily speculate what the trial court would have done had it been aware of the demand filed
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by the defendant, and what the defendant would have decided, had he been required to choose
between having a trial within the 120 day limit or being given more time to resolve his
problems with his attorney (although he by no means concedes that it would have been
necessary or proper to force him to make such a choice.)
FOURTH ISSUE: At the arraignment on September 6, 1989 (fifty-six days after
the defendant filed his demand for disposition), the court set the trial for February 15,1990,
which was two hundred eighteen days after the delivery of the defendant's demand, 98 days
beyond the statutory limit. Defendant contends that such delay was unreasonable, considering that the court could have granted his initial request for new counsel and still have left
two months before trial within the 120 days.
FIFTH ISSUE: The court found in ruling on the defendant's motion to dismiss, that
"Failure to object to the trial setting at the arraignment amounted to waiver of the statutory
right to a trial with 120 days on the part of the Defendant." (Findings, page 3, paragraph 5)
Defendant contends that this conclusion is directly contrary to this court's holding in State
v. Wilson, 453 P.2d 158, wherein the defendant stood mute under similar circumstances.
The court ruled that the statute placed the burden on the prosecution to bring the case to trial,
and not on the defendant.
SIXTH ISSUE: The legal conclusion that the defendant must show prejudice in
order to claim the protection of Section 77-29-1, is contrary to the statute itself, which refers
to "the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the time required,"
and makes the test of dismissal, whether such failure is supported by good cause. No mention is made of prejudice to the defendant.
The defendant contends that the trial court has confused the issues involved in a
question of speedy trial with the requirements of the statute in question.
SEVENTH ISSUE: The legal conclusion that "the delay in conducting the trial did
not result from actions or inactions by the prosecution," {Findings, pg. ignore the language
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of the statute quoted in the second preceeding paragraph, which places a burden on the
prosecution to "have the matter heard within the time required" op. cit. It is thus clear that
the legislative intented that the inaction of the prosecution in failing to request an earlier
trial date and in failing to bring the demand of the defendant to the court's attention should
result in a dismissal of the case.
EIGHTH ISSUE: Rule 29(c) U.R.Cr.P. sets forth a specific procedure to be followed whenever a defendant files an affidavit alleging bias or prejudice on the part of the
judge trying his case. The defendant in the present case filed a verified motion, which is the
equivalent of an affidavit, alleging the facts that Judge Bunnell had previously prosecuted
him and later, after ascending to the bench, disqualified himself from conducting a trial of
the defendant in 1981. Under the statute, the court should have immediately stayed the
proceedings, even though the jury panel had been called and submitted the issue to another
district court judge for determination of whether he should be disqualified. The court instead summarily denied the motion without even permitting argument. The Defendant was
thus denied his right to be heard on this issue and to have an impartial party decide the issue.
NINTH ISSUE: Defendant contends that the fact that Judge Bunnell had, as district
attorney, prosecuted him, and thereafter, as district judge, acknowledged bias by disqualifying himself from conducting a trial of the defendant, establishes bias and prejudice as a matter of law and that it was therefore error to deny defendant's motion for Judge Bunnell to
disqualify himself.
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DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
There are two basic questions presented in this appeal, (1) the setting of trial beyond
the 120 statutory limit, and (2) the refusal of Judge Bunnell to disqualify himself. Rather
than discuss these two issues in tenns of all of their sub-issues, this discussion will combine
the sub-issues for purposes of argument.
The 120-day Disposition Issue: The trial court seems to have held that the demand
filed by the defendant was legally insufficient, although it also stated at one point that strict
compliance with the statute was not necessary as long as actula notice was given to the
prosecuttion (Set Transcript of Motions Hearing, Page 20, lines 4-7, 18-21). But on page
23, at line 22, the court states as its finding, "that the notice was probably insufficient to put
the state on notice that [the defendant] was contending the 120-day cut off." While it is true
taht the form used did not list every particular set forth in the statute, it was certainly sufficient to notify the county attorney that the defendant was asserting his rights under the said
statute, since he, as the prosecutor, knew better than anyone else what charges he had filed
against the defendant and where they were filed, especially where these were the only charges pending against the defendant in his jurisdiction. Furthermore, the state cannot invite
the defendant's reliance on the forms it furnishes him by offering them to him with advice
and assistance in filling them out and filing them, and then claim that the demand was void
because the forms used were inadequate. Fredrichsen v. City of Lakewood, 491 P.2d 805
(California, 19664)
In discussing the application of Section 77-29-1, the first point that should be made
is that this is not the same issue as whether a defendant is denied a speedy trial, but the trial
court, in ruling on Defendant's motion to dismiss, explicitly found just the opposite, (see
Motions Hearing transcript, page 19) Although the cases dealing with speedy trial have imposed a requirement that the defendant show some prejudice to himself or some tactical advantage

to

the

prosecution

resulting

from

the

delay

in

trial.
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State v. Smith, 699 P.2d 711 (1985), at 713, this requirement has never been imposed in
cases dealing with the 120-day time limit set by Section 77-29-1.
Rather, the cases dealing with this statute started by establishing that the defendant
had only to establish that he had filed the demand required and that 120 days had elapsed
without his case being brought to trial. In State v. Wilson, supra, the defendant stood silent
at the trial setting and waited until the 120 days had gone by before moving to dismiss. The
court held that the trial court lost jurisdiction upon the expiration of the time limit and therefore dismissed the case.
The statute was amended by the legislature after the Wilson case to provide that the
court in ruling on a motion to dismiss could deny the same if it appeared that the trial had
been delayed beyond the time limit for some good reason. Several subsequent cases ruled
that where the defendant's counsel requested a delay, State v. Bonny, 477 P.2d 147 (1970);
or the defendant filed a motion for continuance of a trial initially set within the statutory
period, State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115 (1982); or the delay was caused by a co-defendant,
State v. Trujillo, 656 P.2d 403 (1982); the delay beyond the statutory limit was justified and
the defendant could not claim the benefit of the statute. Nevertheless, neither the amended
statute nor the case law has relieved the prosecuting attorney of his duty to see that the trial
is conducted within the time limit once he has received the defendant's demand for disposition. In the present case, the trial court seems to have found what can only be called a "constructive" continuance and then to have turned the defendant's request for new counsel at
arraignment into grounds therefor. In fact, the court, being unaware of the demand filed by
the defendant, cannot be said to have granted any continuance or to have intentionally
delayed the trial beyond the 120-day limit—first, because it had never considered or discussed any trial date within that limit and second, because it had no opportunity to consider
whether the defendant's objections to his appointed counsel was grounds to extend the time
for trial or to give the defendant a choice in the matter. It is entirely possible that, had the
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defendant been given the choice of having the trial within 120 days or having new counsel
appointed, he would have chosen the former.
Another consideration here is that the court could have granted the defendants request and still have set the trial within the the 120 days and the new counsel would have had
up to two months to prepare for trial, more time than the court gave Mr. Chiara. Therefore,
it is highly disingenuous for to assert that the court set the trial date when it did merely out
of consideration for the defendant. When defense counsel requested leave to withdraw, the
court denied the same because it did not want to delay the trial, despite the fact that the defendant had filed complaints with the Utah State Bar against Mr. Thorpe. Instead, the court appointed associate counsel approximately one month before the trial. If the court was inclined
to accomodate the defendant in his conflicts with his counsel, why did it not grant this motion, appoint new counsel, and continue the trial?
Obviously what has happened here is that the prosecutor neglected to carry out his
duty under Section 77-29-1 and the court has attempted to cover his mistake with the fig
leaf of finding that a continuance was granted at the request of the defendant.
The Disqualification Issue: The defendant first made his counsel aware of the facts
supporting disqualification of Judge Bunnell on the day before trial. Thus, his attorney was
unable to file the motion sooner. Despite the fact that Rule 29 provides that the affidavit
shall be filed as soon as practicable after the case has been assigned or the bias or prejudice
is known, the Rule does not provide a sanction for failure to file it timely. Moreover, the
due process right of having an impartial judge is so fundamental that it should not be denied
on the basis of a delay in filing the motion. The trial court, by summarily denying the motion, failed to make a record to support its ruling. Had it followed the rule's procedure, the
trial might have been delayed, but as it stands, the case will have to be retried, because it
can hardly be argued that Judge Bunnell, who had prosecuted the defendant and thereafter
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acknowledged bias by disqualifying himself from presiding over his trial in 1981, is now
totally free of such bias or prejudice.

CONCLUSION
Defendant is entitled to have his convictions herein reversed and all charges dismissed with prejudice for the State's failure to comply with Section 77-29-1. Should this
Court decline to dismiss these charges, the case should be remanded for a new trial on the
basis of bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge, or at very least, for a review of the
allegations of bias by an independent judge.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS _/£L DAY OF JULY, 1990.

Allen S.Thorpe/
Emery County Public Defender
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant

Keith H. Chiara
Attorney at Law
Associate Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
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